Keli konstitucijos interpretavimo aspektai : vertybinių (moralinių) argumentų galimybė ir ribos

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Collection:
Mokslo publikacijos / Scientific publications
Document Type:
Straipsnis / Article
Language:
Lietuvių kalba / Lithuanian
Title:
Keli konstitucijos interpretavimo aspektai: vertybinių (moralinių) argumentų galimybė ir ribos
Alternative Title:
Some aspects of the interpretation of the constitution the possibility and limits of valuable (moral) arguments
In the Journal:
Jurisprudencija [Jurisprudence]. 2009, Nr. 2 (116), p. 45-59
Keywords:
LT
konstitucinė jurisprudencija; konstitucija; doktrina; interpretacija; vertybiniai argumentai.
EN
constitutional jurisprudence; constitution; doctrine; interpretation; moral argues.
Summary / Abstract:

LTPasaulio valstybių konstitucinės justicijos institucijų veiklos praktikoje interpretuojant konstituciją ar kitas teisės normas neretai pasitelkiami argumentai, mokslo teorijose pretenduojantys būti laikomi universaliomis moralinėmis vertybėmis. [...] Straipsnyje analizuojama problematika susijusi su vertybinių (moralinių) argumentų taikymo galimybėmis teisės aiškinimo procese. Analizuojama moralės ir teisės teorijų tendencijos, jomis siekiama pagrįsti universalių vertybių egzistencijos faktą bei pateikti tų universalių vertybių katalogą. Parodoma, kad konstitucija yra išskirtinis teisinis dokumentas, kurio interpretacija yra permanentinis procesas, ir jam įtakos turi daugelis konceptualių veiksnių. [...] Konstatuojama, kad teisės ir moralės teorijose nusistovėjo doktrininis status quo, kurio esmė glūdi keliose įsitvirtinusiose viena kitos niekaip nepaneigiančiose moralinių vertybių universalumo ir reliatyvumo koncepcijose. Kadangi jokia teorija negali pretenduoti į absoliučios tiesos statusą, autorius teigia, kad teisės interpretacijos procese moralinės vertybės negali universalių vertybių forma atsispindėti kaip teisės interpretavimo rezultatas. Tačiau straipsnyje atkreipiamas dėmesys, kad vertybinė (moralinė) refleksija galima per interpretatoriaus subjektyvios vertybių sistemos prizmę. Tuomet konstitucijos normų expressis verbis neapibrėžtumus, konstitucinio reguliavimo dviprasmybes, ect. konkretus interpretatorius aiškinasi vadovaudamasis savo vertybine pasaulėžiūra, ir interpretuotojo teisinė sąmonė, filosofinė pasaulėžiūra, istorinio patyrimo pažinimas, ect., visa tai, ką galėtume pavadinti subjektyvia moraline konstitucija, atsispindi oficialioje konstitucinėje jurisprudencijoje. [Iš leidinio]

ENConstitution is an exclusive legal document, and its interpretation is a process – a continuous work of explanation of its content, the end and qualitative perfection of which may only be considered taking into account the limits of intellectual potential of the particular time. The interpretation of constitution is a permanent process, which is influenced and determined by plenty of conceptual factors. Firstly the supreme juridical power of the constitution as well as its integrity determines the opportunities of its interpreter and applier. Integrity of the constitution is considered to be the legal, philosophical, logical integrity of its norms, which determines an obligation of its interpreter to perceive this legal act as an integral unit, i.e. not only as a catalogue of particular values, but also as a balance of these values. All the constitutional expressis verbis provisions are equal in its’ juridical power, that is why they do not negate each other, on the contrary – each of them only complement others’ content. Besides, it is important to mention that exceptional juridical power of the constitution determines its interpretational self-sufficiency. Constitution can not be interpreted invoking the content of the acts of lower juridical power. Interpreting constitution official interpreter (as well as non official interpreter) uses discretion, which gives him an opportunity to choose methodology of interpretation freely. Single constitutional expressis verbis norms characterize abstract, and searching the balance among different constitutional values often suggests ambiguous inferences. This situation is conditioned by circumstances, that when interpreting constitution often legal arguments become insufficient to formulate unambiguous and ultimate conclusions.Precisely then not only legal, but also philosophical arguments of interpretation have the basis for materiality. Philosophical arguments may evidence as a part of interpreter’s valuable world-view, which would be the basis to choose vectors on interpretation process as well as the content of formulating conclusions. The question of content of valuable world-view is a conceptual problem of theory of law, constitutional law and theory of morals. We have to admit that at the theory of law and the theory of morals status quo is settled, the essence of which is in the entrenchment of two conceptual trends about universality and the relativity of moral values, each of which does not negate the other. Theories of law and morals have not succeeded in formulating digest of universal values, but the endeavor at that direction only supplement the catalogue of subjective theories of law as well as the catalogue of morals. Aforesaid doctrinal status quo formulates situation, when in the process of constitution’s and generally law’s interpretation moral values can not reflect themselves as universal values at the result of interpretation of law. Either way valuable (moral) reflection is possible through the prism of subjective system of interpreter’s values.Then uncertainties of constitutional norms as well as the ambiguities of constitutional regulation are solved in the context of a particular interpreter’s (or interpreters’, if we talk about Constitutional or Supreme Courts, when the judgment is passed collegially) valuable world-view. This way interpreter’s legal consciousness, philosophical world-view, his cognition of historical experience, etc. all that we can call subjective moral constitution, reflects in the official constitutional jurisprudence. Either interpreter (official, non-official) has an opportunity to reflect his own, i.e. subjective conception about the system of values, at the result of interpretation of law. Still only official interpreter’s discretion makes a prerequisite for subjective valuable (moral) worldview to become the part of the constitutional interpretation’s result. Result, which may be the object of doctrinal assessment, but independently of the results of that assessment, precisely this interpretational result shall make real legal consequences. [From the publication]

ISSN:
1392-6195; 2029-2058
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https://www.lituanistika.lt/content/22206
Updated:
2018-12-17 12:31:07
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