Akcininkų ir įmonės vadovo interesų konfliktas

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Mokslo publikacijos / Scientific publications
Document Type:
Straipsnis / Article
Lietuvių kalba / Lithuanian
Akcininkų ir įmonės vadovo interesų konfliktas
Alternative Title:
Conflict of shareholders's and executive manager's interests: which theory is best to study it
In the Journal:
Organizacijų vadyba: sisteminiai tyrimai [Management of Organizations: Systematic Research]. 2001, Nr. 17, p. 191-203
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Akcininkas; Vadovai; Interesų konfliktas; Shareholders; Executive managers; Conflict of interests.
Finansai. Kapitalas / Finance. Capital; Interesų konfliktas; Vadovai.
Conflict of interests; Executive managers; Shareholders.
Summary / Abstract:

LTStraipsnyje tiriamos prielaidos įmonės akcininkų ir vadovų interesų konfliktą nagrinėti ne visuotinai pripažįstamos atstovavimo, bet naujai besivystančios suinteresuotų dalyvių teorijos rėmuose. Pateikiami užsienio ir Lietuvos akcinių bendrovių savininkų dvilypių vaidmenų pavyzdžiai įrodo, kad tradicinis akcininkų ir vadovų interesų konfliktas turi būti nagrinėjamas platesnėje - suinteresuotų dalyvių ir vadovo interesų - plotmėje. Antrąja tyrimo dalimi išsiaiškinama, jog akcininkų koncentracija įmonėse yra pakankama, kad susidarytų dvilypius vaidmenis atliekančių savininkų grupės, turinčios galią įtakoti įmonės tikslus. [Iš leidinio]

ENArticle is analysing prerequisites to study conflict among interests of stockholders and manager's through lens of newly developing stakeholders' concept instead of conventional agency theory. Two steps are taken to find arguments for use of the stakeholders' framework. Factual composition of stockholders is analysed in order to check existence of dual roles of stockholders. The results of composition review in foreign countries and of research in Lithuania made by the author (44 companies from Lithuanian National Securities Exchange current list and list A were researched) confirm that stockholders often play additional roles in their company: as workers, suppliers, financial institutions etc. Therefore, their interests can diverge from pure financial interest to increase value of company. It makes agency theory unable to explain behaviour neither of stockholders nor of managers while solving the conflict of interests. Trying to check the validity of popular viewpoint that stockholders of publicly held companies are quite dispersed and have a little power to influence managers, a concentration of stockholders, concretely the possibility of 3-5 largest stockholders to make powerful alliance in Lithuania (author's original research results) as well as in some other countries (literature review) is analysed. Quite high possibility of shareholders alliances in researched Lithuanian companies were defined: in 77% of the companies five largest stockholders hold more than 1/2 of shares, in 61% of the companies five largest shareholders hold more than 2/3 of shares.The following conclusions are made: stakeholders are able to influence managers of the companies through quite effective channels of stockholders; because of the higher variety of shakeholders' interests comparing with narrow financial view of specialised stockholders it is more reasonable to use stakeholders' framework instead of agency theory in research of conflict among interests of stockholders and executive managers of company. [From the publication]

1392-1142; 2335-8750
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2018-12-17 10:55:33
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