Bolševikinės revoliucijos inspiravimas Vokietijoje ir jo amortizacija Baltijos šalyse 1923 m.

LTStraipsnyje tiriama, kaip ir kodėl Baltijos regione po I pasaulinio karo susikūrusios naujos, modernios valstybės tapo užkarda bolševikinės Rusijos ekspansijai į Europos gilumą. Nustatyta, kad ryškiausias bolševikų revoliucijos eksporto bandymas buvo 1923 m. mėginimas inspiruoti komunistinį perversmą Vokietijoje, į kurią ketinta permesti šimtatūkstantinę Raudonąją armiją, telktą prie SSRS vakarinių sienų, tikintis, kad Baltijos šalys ir Lenkija nesipriešindamos praleis ją į Vokietiją. Tačiau baltiečiai ir lenkai, atlaikę bolševikų spaudimą, nepasidavę grasinimams ir pažadams padėti, nesutiko jokiu, net užmaskuotu, būdu praleisti raudonarmiečių. Dėl tokios pozicijos, taip pat vokiečiams nerodant didesnio revoliucinio entuziazmo ši bolševikų avantiūra žlugo. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Baltijos šalys (Baltic states); Bolševikai; Diplomatija; Lenkija (Lenkijos karalystė. Kingdom of Poland. Poland); Lietuvos ir SSRS santykiai; Revoliucijos eksportas; Vokietija (Germany); Baltic countries; Bolsheviks; Diplomacy; Export of revolution; Germany; Lithuania-USSR relations; Rusija (Russia).

ENThis article is primarily based on the historical documents stored in the archives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Germany. It investigates how the new modern states, which emerged in the Baltic region after the First World War, became a barrier to the expansion of the Bolshevik Russia into the depths of Europe. It was concluded that following the Bolshevik invasion of the Baltic States in 1919 and Bolshevik – Poland war in 1920, the most striking attempt of exporting Bolshevik revolution took place in 1923, during an attempt to inspire a communist coup in Germany. Plans were made to redeploy hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops, which were stationed at the western borders of the USSR, to Germany, in the hope that the Baltic States and Poland would not put up any resistance in letting the Red Army troops cross their territory. The plan was of a truly enormous scale. The Politburo as the Supreme Soviet Government was turned into the headquarters on organizing a coup in Germany. However, almost all of the the Soviet institutions, not only the Comintern, had to contribute to the organizational activities such as providing financial support for the German Communists and delivering revolutionary literature to them. Moreover, revolutionary German military units called sotnias (companies), as supplied with weapons as military and party specialists, were formed; using the model of the Special Soviet Commission, a terrorist group was established to kill people who were going against the Bolsheviks. Contacts with the emerging National Socialist Party were established. In the event of a successful breakthrough in Germany, plans were made to link the German coup to the USSR and move the revolution epicentre from Moscow to Berlin, pursuing global revolution.However, the Bolshevik leaders had to solve the main challenge of redeploying their army to Germany – it had to overcome the “barrier” of new states which emerged after the war. Initially, the troops would have had to force their way through Romania and Czechoslovakia, however this idea was named unsuitable by Joseph Stalin. It was decided to focus on forcibly redeploying the troops through the so-called Vilnius Corridor and reach East Prussia by directing the troops along the Lithuanian-Polish border. It was important to ensure that the Red Army would reach Germany without any delay, being exposed to any major damage or any incurring major losses. In the attempt of making sure that the troops maintained their combat readiness and any international conflict was avoided, it was decided to seek an arrangement with Poland and the Baltic States to be granted an unhindered passage of the army. To this end, the diplomatic mission, led by the influential Bolshevik Vikdor Kop was sent to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The goal of the mission was to disguise the request of the true nature for the army passage by inventing a defensive legend. The legend had it, that Entente would try to suppress a potential revolution in Germany, and the Soviets would “grant moral and material assistance” over the German proletariat. In all of the three countries visited by the diplomatic mission, Kop offered to sign the guarantee pacts, which, allegedly, were supposed to guarantee unhindered Soviet army transit to Germany, in the occurrence of “possible events” happening in it (Germany). Both the governments of Zigfrid Anna Majerovic and Ernest Galvanauskas as well as the Polish authorities, albeit maintaining a different standpoint towards Moscow, unequivocally rejected Kop’s proposal, and did not succumb to his threats or the temptation of getting concessions.The same standpoint was taken by Estonians who chose to send a negative reply through regular diplomatic channels. The Baltic States and Poles made this decision themselves, without being given any promises by England or other Western states to be provided direct support, even in the event of their refusal to launch démarches against Moscow as a sign of protest. This way, the Baltic countries and Poland made a significant contribution to the suppression of Soviet military intervention, the destruction of the ambitions to pursue global revolution as well as successful endeavours in hamstringing the looming threat for both Germany and the whole of Europe. Furthermore, the majority of the German society did not succumb to the Soviet attempts to stage a coup, so the grand Soviet revolutionary instigation failed to reach its goal. The incitement for the breakthrough that aimed to undermine German sovereignty took place at the time when the masterminds of this plot, that is, the Soviets, were pursuing military cooperation with Germany and strengthening official political relations, symbolized by the Treaty of Rapallo, which had been signed just a year before. Assessing by the authors of this article such an external contradiction is the apogee of a treacherous and sneaky foreign policy of the USSR, known in historiographic sources as ambivalent foreign policy. The above described events serve as the most illustrative example of this treacherous policy. Exposure to the imminent threat related to the export of revolution, namely that of the Red Army entering the Baltic States and Poland, failed to properly mobilize the four countries involved. Only Latvia and Estonia succeeded in overcoming territorial and other disagreements and reacted in a more adequate manner to this threat by forming a defence alliance in November 1st, 1923, hereby committing to provide political, diplomatic and military assistance to each other. [From the publication]

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