Mixed signals: incentive structures and party strategies in mixed electoral systems

ENInstitutional designers have recently shown a preference for mixed electoral systems, combining proportional representation (PR) and single member district systems (SMD) into a single election. Underlying this choice has been a belief that Duverger's Propositions would apply to the individual components of the system. However, the unique features of mixed systems undermine the application of standard analytical approaches. The strategic incentives influencing party strategies are rooted in contamination effects. Contamination is the interaction between PR and SMD components of mixed systems that affects the decision-making of voters, contributors, candidates and parties. While existing scholarship suggests that political actors compartmentalize the PR and SMD sections, there is strong evidence of interaction. This dissertation assesses contamination effects with data from nine mixed systems, but focuses on data from Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine. The empirical analysis produces three major findings: the mechanical effect in mixed systems is more forgiving to marginal parties than the mechanical effect in SMD; parties tend to participate in the whole mixed system, contingent upon resources; and SMD candidate placement positively affects local PR vote outcomes. Additional qualitative data based on interviews with political actors in Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that political parties recognize contamination effects and develop strategies to take advantage of them. All of the evidence points to the emergence of multiparty competition in the PR and SMD components, as well as the entire mixed system, contradicting Duvergerian expectations.