Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės kancleris Leonas Sapiega ir Smolensko karo kampanija (1609-1611)

LTReikšminiai žodžiai: Karai; Leonas Sapiega; Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštystė (LDK; Grand Duchy of Lithuania; GDL); 17 amžius; Smolenskas; Smolensko kampanija; Zigmantas Vaza, 1566-1632 (Zygmunt III Vaza; Sigismund); Leon Sapieha; Lew Sapieha; Lithuanian XVII c. history; Sigismund Vasa; Smolensk; Smolensk campaign; The Great Duchy of Lithuania; Wars.

ENLew Sapieha was one of the figures behind the Smolensk campaign (September, 1609-June, 1611), i.e., its legal concept and direction of the march, to have had a marked influence on the king on the eve of the march and in its early stages. The Lithuanian chancellor utilized his wide network of clients, relatives and informants to collect information on the situation in Moscow. In the early stages of the military advance on Smolensk, Sapieha believed the city would surrender peacefully and hurried to coordinate the conditions for surrender himself. Failing to convince the Smolensk population to surrender, Sapieha constantly questioned the purpose of the military moves underway. Even though he brought one of the largest regiments of mercenaries to the defensive walls of Smolensk, during the campaign the chancellor did not prove to be an able military commander. Instead, he appeared to lack both the necessary experience and abilities for this role. We may also doubt whether Lew Sapieha was at all times a willing participant of the campaign: his constant dissatisfaction with the progress of the seige; his frequent, albeit brief, departures from the camp; his personal non-participation in the fighting; his search for homely comforts in the camp and so on suggest the chancellor was rather unsuitable for military service. It is similarly unlikely that he possessed the charisma typical of military commanders. This is especially evident in his relations with his soldiers. The evidence at hand shows that prior to the last storming of Smolensk, Sapieha had either dismissed a majority of his mercenaries or allocated them to other locations. In one way or another, Sapieha’s men did not participate in the victorious storming of Smolensk. Sapieha’s role in the Smolensk military campaign cannot be assessed based on the chancellor’s personal contribution alone.The sons, fiduciaries and servants (Aleksander Gosiewski, Jonas Gridičius) had become involved in the campain as a result of the chancellor’s activities, and themselves carried out important tasks at times. There is no doubt that the appointment of Aleksander Gosiewski as commander of the Polish garrison in Moscow must be related to Lew Sapieha’s refusal to go to Moscow himself. In other words, Sapieha did not travel to Moscow because he saw that the promises already made by Stanisław Żółkiewski to the Muscovites were not aligned with Sigismund Vasa’s (Lit. Žygimantas Vaza, Pol. Zygmunt III Waza, King of Poland, 1587-1632, and Grand Duke of Lithuania, 1588-1632) plans. Precisely these actions made by the chancellor may be viewed as the features of a shrewd and insightful politician. Following the start of negotiations with Moscow that took place near Klushino, the significance of Sapieha, an experienced negotiator, in the leadership circle of the military campaign once again grew. However, with the break down in negotiations in April, 1611, Sapieha’s position in the ruler’s circle weakened. A political conjuncture unfavourable to the Lithuanian chancellor became apparent at this time: failure of the plans for the peaceful occupation of Smolensk; the loss of one of their most important allies, Stanisław Żółkiewski; and Aleksander Gosiewski’s unsuccessful attempts at controlling the situation in Moscow. Most likely all of these aspects, as well as the chancellor’s constantly critical view of the king’s initiatives, distanced Sapieha from the ruler of the Commonwealth.Although we do not hold any data indicating that during the entire military campaign Sapieha was constantly in favour of the idea of re-conquering Smolensk, that is precisely the impression that we get when we assess his concept for the declaration of war and efforts at rejoining the regained territories to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. There is no doubt that the personal participation of Lew Sapieha in the campaign gave him a moral foundation for demanding that, for the last time in history, the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania be markedly expanded. As we know, this demand was crowned in success. [From the publication]