Intra-executive conflict and cabinet instability: effects of semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe

ENIn this article we ask to what extent and in what ways intraexecutive conflicts increase the risk of pre-term termination of governments. Comparing eight semi-presidential systems in Central and Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Russia, comprising a total of 65 instances of intra-executive (president–cabinet) coexistence between 1991 and 2007 – we examine the link between intra-executive conflict and cabinet instability. This sample represents a deliberate attempt to cover transitional countries with different forms of semi-presidential regimes (premierpresidential and president-parliamentary). Also, in the period under review, all these countries have experienced an uncertain transitional phase, making them especially appropriate for the kind of analysis we have in mind. In transitional countries, effects conventionally associated with cabinet instability – disruptive policy making, political unpredictability and lack of political accountability – are generally considered undesirable, as potential threats to the fragile democratization process. The article is thus related to the rich body of literature on institutional design and democracy performance. More specifically, it contributes to the more limited albeit growing research on the pros and cons of semi-presidentialism. Proponents of semi-presidentialism have declared it to be an advantageous constitutional arrangement for new democracies4 while sceptics have associated it with institutional conflict and political risks.