Tomo Akviniečio valios samprata

LTGlaustą valios apibrėžimą randame Tomo Akviniečio „Suma prieš pagonis“ traktato II knygoje 47 skyriuje. Valią Tomas priskiria intelektinėms substancijoms ir apibrėžia kaip norą, kylantį iš intelekto arba proto: „tuose, kurie supranta, jis (noras – D. M. S) vadinamas intelektiniu arba protiniu noru, o tai ir yra valia“, o jos paskirtis – siekti intelekto pasiūlyto gėrio. Norėdami suprasti Tomo dėstomą valios sampratą turime pamatyti, kaip jis aiškina prigimtį ir jos veikimą, kokias norų (siekių) rūšis įvardija ir kaip apibūdina protingojo noro, t. y. valios, ypatybes [Iš Įvado].

ENAccording to Aquinas, the significance of will consists in this: it makes intellectual substances masters of their own actions. Seeking a more profound analysis of will, the author starts from the consideration of appetitus as a genus and its species: natural appetite, sensitive appetite and intellectual appetite. All appetites strive for good, but differently. Inanimate bodies and plants strive without perceiving good, animals perceive only particular goods, but intellectual substances have a knowledge of common good. This depends on the nature of these beings. Each nature is an essence of a being, as seen in action. Action is a perfection of a thing. A thing is imperfect as much as in lacks action. There are two kinds of action: those, which remain in a subject and those, which come outside, e.g. a mental project of an artisan, is realised in his product. In actions of this kind participate both intellect and will. The will follows the intellect and relates the intellect to an object of action, but action itself is related by the intellect to the common good.