F. Nietzsche’ės mokslo filosofijos alternatyva

LTStraipsnyje pateikiama Nietzsche’ės požiūrio į modernaus (mokslinio) žinojimo situaciją interpretacija. Pažinimą Nietzsche suvokia kaip meno "praformą", besiremiančią iliuziniu tiesos pobūdžiu, tiesos-netiesos dialektikos regimybe, ir atsisako radikalios mokslo ir meno opozicijos. Tokia opozicija, pažinimas "contra" menas, sukelia nihilistinius padarinius. Mokslas, anot Nietzsche’ės, turi būti ne teorinių koncepcijų sistema, o laikiškosios, niekada iš esmės nepažinios, tikrovės meninė, praktinė techne. Kaip loginis ir teorinis projektas, mokslas visada išliks implicite nihilistiškas. Tad jis negali būti objektyviai neutralus, todėl nuolat peržiūrėtinas savo galimybės pagrindu, tai yra iš meno ir gyvenimo pozicijų. [Iš straipsnio, p. 147]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Perspektyvizmas; Nihilizmas; Meno ir mokslo filosofija; Galios valia; Perspective; Nihilism; Philosophy of art and science; Will of power.

ENAccording to Nietzsche, in the modern age science states the question not of epistemological type, viz. "what is science?" or "how it functions?" but of moral background: "why science?" The answer can be both positive and destructive. Positive - science itself has never been and can never be a system, a univocal and stationary "rational" process based on logical and lawful machinery, and it takes a close look to presume that its authority is nothing but a moral prejudice. Science is truthful and objective - it bursts out only through laughing. Science opens you the world, it makes your life meaningful - Nietzsche laughs himself into convulsions. He laughs away the dark cloud of superstructuring and superrationalizing agencies that make science a moral habit and professes a light, unobligatory, windy, optimistic belief that science is nothing more but just another dream and human wish to be happy in its own creations. Destructive - because asking "why science?" we once more come to the question of values and no longer can be sure whether we find ourselves in the position wee came from and risk not just to be lost to all sense of duty and shame. At one’s own risk one asks himself whether he is ready to consider the possibility that his "rationality", his "morality" has come too far and his life, its most valuable features may be untrue, disconnected, and that untruth itself may be a condition of life. [From the publication]