"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" ir loginis pozityvizmas

LTŠiame straipsnyje analizuojama klasikinė, arba įprastinė, vieno svarbiausių filosofijos istorijoje veikalų - L. Wittgensteino "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1), arba "Loginio-filosofinio traktato", interpretacija. Klasikine "Traktato" interpretacija laikau tą, kurią pasiūlė loginiai pozityvistai, o konkrečiai - Vienos ratelis, ir kuri buvo dominuojanti nuo pat "Traktato" pasirodymo iki L. Wittgensteino užrašų knygelių ("Notebooks 1914- 1916") pasirodymo (1961 m.) ir dar ilgai po to. Net ir šiomis dienomis negalima sakyti, kad pozityvistiškasis. "Traktato" interpretavimas tėra tik žila praeitis. Daugelis šiuolaikinių autorių žvelgia į L. Wittgensteino "Traktatą", nepajėgdami atsiriboti nuo loginių pozityvistų sudėtų akcentų.

ENThis article deals with classical, or usual interpretation of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus". This is the interpretation, proposed by representatives of logical positivism. According to this interpretation, "Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus" seems to say that it is possible to speak only about the facts. Propositions that are not dealing with facts are pseudo-propositions. Logical positivists used "Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus" as a means of criticism turned against metaphysical propositions. However, Wittgenstein himself was not so radical in regard to such propositions. Some propositions represent what they mean, i.e. some state of affairs. Another propositions are not such logical pictures of their references. In a sense they are pseudo-propositions, but they show what they appear to say. The "showing" propositions often are more important, than the "saying" propositions, i.e. representing the states of affairs. Even "Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus" itself is written in "showing", not in "saying" propositions.