Pasaulėvaizdžio etiniai aspektai fenomenologijoje

ENThe phenomenological problem of Husserl is an integral world without the distinction of subject and object. The world is integral when the subject is open to the intersubjective linguistic world. The integral world is based on epoché as the suspension of natural approaches. It stands next to the suspension of the subject (the self) and to directedness to the other person. This extension of worldview, thanks to epoché or the suspension of the old wolrdview, Husserl calls phenomenological or transcendentini reduction. Heidegger extends epoché to tragic being to death. The content of this extension is Dasein as being in the world (Insein) and being with another person (Milsein). In this way the tragic suspension of the self opens the integral horizon of the living world (Lebensuvll) and extends the horizon of worldview. So the world is integral if it is the open living world that we have when we suspend the old view. Does the integral world mean that phenomenological reduction has an ethical aspect? Levinas writes about the Other that transgresses the limits of the self. After I transgress myself and lose my selfness, I reestablish it in my intention to meet the Other. In this way we have "being in the horizon" or in tire world. Ethics is here a condition of integrality and openness of the world. The identity of the self is constituted as responsibility that has roots beyond me. If, as Levinas saw it ethics has an open direction to the Other, then ethics supports the idea of phenomenology about the integral living world.