Soft law vaidmuo konstitucinio teismo jurisprudencijoje

LTStraipsnyje siekiama išsiaiškinti, kodėl Konstitucinis Teismas, nagrinėdamas konstitucinės justicijos bylas, formuluodamas oficialiosios konstitucinės doktrinos nuostatas ir, galiausiai, pasirinkdamas konkretų bylos sprendimą turėtų atsižvelgti į su bylos problematika susijusias soft law normas ir jose įtvirtintas konstitucinės teisės vystymosi tendencijas. Teisinės galios neturinčių, tačiau neabejotiną teisinį svorį savyje talpinančių dokumentų paminėjimas nutarimo tekste praturtina Konstitucinio Teismo argumentaciją, net jei jais tiesiogiai nėra remiamasi formuluojant bylos sprendimo pagrindimą, parodo tarptautinį bylos problemos kontekstą ir gali būti netiesioginiu įkvėpimo šaltiniu aiškinant iki tol neatskleistas Konstitucijos nuostatas ar toliau plėtojant oficialiąją konstitucinę doktriną. Konstitucinio Teismo pasirinkimas savo nutarimų tekstuose pateikti nuorodas į Venecijos komisijos priimtas nuomones, studijas, rekomendacijas ar kitus Europos Tarybos ar Europos Sąjungos institucijų priimtus teisinės galios neturinčius teisės aktus neturėtų būti vertinamas kaip keliantis grėsmę Konstitucijos viršenybei ar nacionalinės teisės nuostatoms. Be abejo, soft law aktais konstitucinėje jurisprudencijoje remiamasi tik tada ir tik tiek, kiek tai tinka nagrinėjamai bylai ir kiek tai atitinka valstybės teisinės sistemos ypatumus. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Konstitucinis Teismas; Konstitucinė jurisprudencija; Oficialioji konstitucinė doktrina; Konstitucijos viršenybė; Minkštoji teisė (Soft law); Europos Tarybos komisija „Demokratija per teisę“ (Venecijos komisija); Constitutional Court; Constitutional jurisprudence; Official constitutional doctrine; Construction of the Constitution; Supremacy of the Constitution; Soft law; European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).

ENThe aim of this article is to find out why the Constitutional Court, while examining constitutional justice cases, formulating the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine and, finally, choosing a specific solution of the case, could or sometimes even should take into consideration soft law norms and the constitutional law development tendencies. The legal effects produced by the soft law was undeniably recognized in Garibaldi’s case by the Court of Justice of European Union and the obligation for national courts implementing the EU law to pay attention to the EU’s soft law norms was settled out. Most likely this obligation means that national courts have to prove that they are familiar with the appropriate soft law norms and after choosing their own solution meeting soft law norms or not, they should indicate the reasons of chosen different interpretation than recommended. It can be stated that the necessity to pay respect to the soft law in constitutional jurisprudence in appropriate cases is inevitable, if the Constitutional Court do not seek to isolate itself from European and international constitutional context. It is even more so, when there are no binding acts in the specific field of law. It goes without saying that the Constitutional Court would rely on such documents only if there will be no contradictions with the constitutional provisions and will correspond to the particularities of national legal system.Soft law can be perceived as the source of inspiration for judges examining constitutional justice cases and formulating constitutional doctrine and as the signpost for lawmaking subjects adopting binding acts. Sometimes soft law can help understand the complicated or unclear provisions of binding acts and foresee possible consequences, and sometimes it is the only legal act regulating some sort of relationships, especially when it concerns new challenges arising to the changing societies (such as technological progress that obviously will affect human rights and freedoms etc.). There is no reason to invent the new definitions pertinent to the constitutional justice case if they are enshrined in the legal act, even if it is soft, adopted by the competent institution of constitutional law. Soft law is often taken into consideration in the texts of constitutional judgments as a part of international context of the case, as explanatory documents of the notions or examined principles, as the strengthening piece of chosen reasoning and sometimes even as the part of interpretation of constitutional norms. The jurisprudence of Lithuanian, Latvian and Moldovan constitutional courts was analyzed in order to prove the expansion of the use of soft law and the necessity to continue to do so. The constitutional soft law regulates issues common to all the democratic states as it is based on universally recognized principles of democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights.Adopted mostly by the European Commission “For the Democracy through Law” (known as Venice Commission) it proposes legal regulation and some solutions of the constitutional problems that are not adopted or implemented in the national legal system, but should be followed by all the states which have chosen the path of democracy. Therefore, it is not only possible, but sometimes it is necessaire to let the soft law guide. And as the constitutional soft law is based on the values that could be derived from almost all democratic constitution, the possibility that there could be contradiction with the national constitutional provision or that it could menace to the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution doesn’t seem very plausible. [From the publication]