ENIn the second half of 1919 and early 1920, the military and political activities of the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR) in the Baltic region provided conditions to implement the ideas of independence of the Belarusian People’s Republic. The aim of the Belarusian People’s statehood was delivered on the international stage at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. From August 1919, foreign political activities of the BPR in the Baltic region were concentrated towards Latvia, Estonia and Poland. Concentration on the military and diplomatic activities in Latvia and Estonia were successful: BPR diplomatic missions were set up in these countries and Belarusian national colonies began to be established. Joining the Tartu Conference Entente Cordiale opened the possibility of military cooperation with the Baltic countries in order to create a buffer zone between Soviet Russia and the Baltic countries – the area to create a militarily and politically independent Belarus. At the end of 1919, the broader diplomatic operation of the BPR in the Baltic countries was partly associated with the objective of the BPR to pursue a policy more independent from Lithuania. However, as shown by the analysis, the interests of the Republic of Lithuania and of the BPR as to the organisation of the national army, and searches for allied military derivatives were different in many cases. The squad of Stanislav Bulak-Balachovic was no exception, as in the summer of 1919 it became a free military agent. The general’s squad was ready to fight and successfully fought for Estonia, moreover, it could be used to create a bridgehead in the territory of Vitebsk controlled by the BPR, and to implement the federal concept of Josef Pilsudski. The Polessk march and re-declaration of independence of the BPR in November 1920 in Mozyr meant that the two concepts were partially implemented.Lithuanian leaders had the opportunity to win over Stanislav Bulak-Balachovic; however, it failed to take the relevant political decision. Therefore, the military potential of the general was not used for the purposes of the Lithuanian army and became an additional military and partly propaganda argument of BPR diplomacy. Due to the formation of the new states in the Baltic region and the peace talks between the former adversaries, allied and volunteer armies of third parties or unrepresented nations had to choose either to return home, integrate or look for new warlords (military commanders). The White Guard squad of Stanislav Bulak-Balachovic mostly consisted of Belarusians and Ukrainians, as well as of people unsympathetic to Bolshevik Russia; therefore, the decision of the general to switch to the disposition of the Polish leadership was fully justified. This treatment of the analysis of the activities of the Stanislav Bulak- Balachovic units prevented controversial assessments of him – was he an adventurer or a bandit, or a national hero? – and focused on the analysis of the military potential of the general’s squad, and the aspects of its use in BPR diplomacy, and the development of Belarusian diplomacy in the Baltic countries.