Stany zjednoczone wobec paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow i losu republik bałtyckich: Litwy, Łotwy I Estonii (1939-1941)

ENThe Baltic republics occupied a rather distant or outright peripheral place in American politicy during the interwar period. After the First World War Washington did not immediately recognize their independence, and initially was inclined to refuse to recognize Soviet Russia and thus the division of the Russian Empire. Only after 1922, when the line of the non-recognition of new Russian frontiers was abandoned, did it become possible to officially recognize Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and to institute diplomatie agencies. The nomination of President F. D. Roosevelt in 1933 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow did not comprise a fundamental breakthrough in the treatment of the Baltic states. Nonetheless, in its capacity as a buffer zone between Germany and Russia, this region increasingly attracted the attention o f the White House (the mission of Ambassador J. Davies in 1937 aimed at becoming acquainted with local relations and moods). The first significant signal o f looming German-Soviet rivalry along the Baltic was Hitler’s annexation of Memel in 1939. Owing to the small size o f the controversial territory and its slight significance Washington remained rather indifferent, with Secretary of State Hull issuing only an enigmatic declaration. America paid greater attention to observing and analyzing the manoeuvres carried out by Moscow, especially from the moment when Litvinov - an adherent of collective security - was replaced by Molotov (1938). The Franco-British-Soviet debates, albeit dominated by demands made by the Kremlin, intent on creating a Soviet protectorate, were received in Washington with hopes for an anti-German alliance, with Roosevelt in favour o f not interrupting the negotiations. Nonetheless, the American President did not appear to be surprised by news about the signing of the German-Soviet pact. [...].