Ar vertikalus kainų fiksavimas yra blogis?

LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjamas istoriškai vienas iš griežčiausiai vertinamų vertikaliųjų apribojimų - vertikalus kainų fiksavimas. Atskleidžiamas susiformavęs požiūris j tokio pobūdžio vertikaliuosius apribojimus Europos Sąjungos ir Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų konkurencijos teisės sistemose, aptariamas tokio susitarimo teigiamas ir neigiamas poveikis konkurencijai, daug dėmesio skiriant ekonominio poveikio analizei. Atsižvelgiantį straipsnyje išplėtotus argumentus dėl ekonominio tokių susitarimų poveikio konkurencijai, pateikiama kritiška nuomonė apie Europos Komisijos ir Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos tarybos vykdomą konkurencijos politiką vertikalaus kainų fiksavimo susitarimų atžvilgiu. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Vertikalus kainų fiksavimas; Konkurencijos teisės sistemos; Ekonominio poveikio analizė; Konkurencijos tarybos politika; Vertical price fixing; Competition law systems; Analysis of economic effects; Policy of Competition Council.

ENVertical price fixing historically is one of the most harshly treated vertical restraints in competition law systems of both European Union and the US. Although criticised by the economic theory for a long time, this approach has been weakened only after the Leegin decision of the US Supreme Court delivered in 2007. The wave of discussions initiated by the mentioned judgement revealed that vertical agreements regarding resale price maintenance cannot be considered as exclusively banning the competition. The article reveals the assessment of vertical price fixing in European Union and US competition law systems. Upon performing the historical analysis of the European Union competition policy it may be concluded that notwithstanding the fact that vertical price fixing agreements may be theoretically justified by granting an individual exemption pursuant to Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, due to practically undeniable presumptions, enormous burden of proof and extremely negative attitude of the European Commission, such agreements arc effectively prohibited cle facto per se. While seeking to assess the actual effect of the vertical price fixing to the competition, the article examines the ways in which this vertical restraint may facilitate competition and where the potential dangers can be identified. From such analysis a conclusion is drawn that depending on various factors and the market power of the relevant undertakings, these vertical restraints may have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, therefore exclusively negative attitude towards such agreements is incompatible with the economic analysis of their effects. Considering the results of the performed analysis, a critical opinion regarding the competition policy of Lithuania is presented, criticising the decision to align the effects of vertical price fixing to those created by the horizontal cartels. [From the publication]