LTŠiame straipsnyje apžvelgiama įmonių valdymo (jų veiklos įtakojimo) problema, siekiant apsaugoti bankų interesus, taip pat išskiriami kreditinių institucijų dalyvavimo įmonių valdyme privalumai ir trūkumai bei veiksniai, skatinantys kreditinių institucijų tiesioginį dalyvavimą įmonių valdyme. Straipsnyje taip pat nagrinėjamos Lietuvos bankų įtakos įmonių veiklai problemos bei pasiūlymai, kaip padidinti tiek kredituojamų įmonių, tiek ir jų kreditorių - bankų veiklos efektyvumą.
ENFor the time being problems of creditors interest protection are analysed more intensively in the literature of finance. The great importance is attached to banks real possibilities to influence the activity of indebted enterprises in order to improve their efficiency and, respectively, to reduce the risk of the financial activity of commercial banks. The worldwide practice (Japan, Germany, United States, U. K., etc.) of management of enterprises by their main creditors (banks) is shortly surveyed. Problems of risk reducing of banks activity (in order to recover debts from heavily indebted enterprises as much as possible) is very necessary in countries of transition economies, including Lithuania. The problem is that different types of investors (mainly shareholders and creditors) usually invest or lend to companies huge amounts of money, but interests of these different types of investors, in the opinion of the author of this article, are protected inadequately. For example, shareholders can manage and influence the activity of enterprises, but interests of creditors (banks, according to this article) are protected considerably worse. Taking into account, that banks can influence the activity of indebted enterprises only on the basis of clauses of loan treaties, real possibilities of reducing the risk of such banking activity are very restricted. Before influencing the activity of debtors by banks, it is necessary to weigh the pros and cons of such process. The close relationship between bank and enterprise can improve the access to useful information. This condition also increases the access of enterprise to external financial resources. The interrupting to the activity of debtor by bank can be related with positive market response and lower costs of external financing. This condition can also increase the firm's availability to access to other alternative financial resources.On the other hand, the close relationship between bank and enterprise arises the responsibility of the bank for the borrower's financial results. The real actions, performing by banks, in order to influence the activity of debtors depend on many circumstances, such as performance volatility of borrowers, the amount of accessible alternative financial resources, the size of borrowers and their assets (particularly fixed), capital structure, borrowers reliability, etc. Banks, performing in Lithuania, can slightly influence the activity of indebted enterprises, though most of banks suffer from bad loans portfolios. On the whole, they often have irrational choices: either finance poorly performed borrowers or finance well managed, young, but not having available valuable pledge, enterprises. This is also irrational for banks, performing in Lithuania, to acquire stocks by buying shares or by converting debts to shares (in order to reduce interest conflicts of different types stockholders, to lessen the burden of heavily indebted borrowers), because many firms, operating in Lithuania, are not profitable. According to this reason, these shares are illiquid and such investments would become unsuitable. In addition, security markets in Lithuania are also inefficient. The author of this article also draws some conclusions, that, for all that, the restructuring of borrowers debts by banks has positive and negative effects: it's quite risky decision for banks, though the burden of borrowers debts is reduced; the restructuring of debt can improve the performance of debtors; the improved performance of debtors can arise the liquidity of their securities and, generally, the efficiency of public securities markets; the improved performance of debtors can reduce the risk of their lenders, etc.On the other hand, there are no guarantees, that lenders, which have the authority over their borrowers, will be competent (for example, they will not lack special knowledge in the activity of debtor) managing their activity in the proper way.