Atlygio sistemų reikšmė bankų veiklai

LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjama atlygio sistemų reikšmė bankų veiklai. Ydingas atlygio sistemas siejant su moralinės rizikos ir nepalankaus pasirinkimo problemomis, svarstoma, kaip bankuose taikytos atlygio sistemos prisidėjo prie šiuo metu vykstančios pasaulinės finansų krizės susidarymo. Remiantis šalies bankų viešai skelbtomis misijomis, vizijomis, tikslais ir vertybėmis, nagrinėjama, kaip netinkami darbuotojų atlygio nustatymo principai lėmė neatitikimų tarp banko deklaruojamų ir jo darbuotojų siekiamų tikslų bei vertybių. Atsižvelgiant į pasaulinės finansų krizės atskleistus atlygio sistemų trūkumus ir įvairių institucijų formuluojamus atlygio nustatymo principus, pateikiami siūlymai bankams ir jų priežiūros institucijoms, kaip atlygio sistemas padaryti veiksmingesnes ir ko reikėtų vengti jas kuriant.

ENThe global financial crisis initiated discussions on possible shortcomings in banks’ remuneration systems. It is argued that one of the main reasons for this worldwide financial crisis was shortcomings in remuneration systems that motivated for short-term results and profit, neglecting long-run stability of banks. Short-term goals motivated the banks to increase their market share during the economic upturn and growing credit portfolios, therefore prudent risk management was neglected. Analyzed theoretical aspects of the remuneration problem suggest that shortcomings in remuneration systems have led to adverse selection and moral hazard. Because of adverse selection and moral hazard banks got unexpected results, i.e. large losses instead of expected high profits stemming from extending credits to wrongly selected clients. Both adverse selection and moral hazard have led banks to weaker risk control together with weaker all three lines of defence against undesirable risk taking. The performed analyses suggest that significant costs at banks take the form of remuneration costs. Although this would suggest that banks should pay close attention to the management of remuneration costs and associated risk, not all banks have established remuneration committees. Secondly, the research has revealed that no bank claims that its mission, vision or goal are to hold larger market share, extend more credits or any similar goal related to adverse selection or moral hazard. On the contrary, majority of banks claim that they want to be the best employers, profitable and safe banks to their shareholders, partners for their clients in managing risks, to have the most satisfied customers, to be socially responsible, etc. Core values of the banks analyzed also reveal that they follow only the best standards.Contrary to these high standard visions, missions, goals and values, this paper concludes that banks have undermined their own values and de facto followed some other targets (increase market share, extend as many credits as possible, etc.). Having analyzed different aspects of remuneration systems (general criteria for setting contracts, including remuneration contracts; role and functions of remuneration committee and remuneration policy at banks; forms and methods of remuneration, including fixed versus variable salary, quantitative versus qualitative variables in deciding on variable remuneration part; need to incorporate risk aspects into remuneration systems, including relationship between risk and remuneration time horizons; remuneration pool and it’s distribution; remuneration of persons taking control functions in banks; and finally role of supervisors in making banks having high remuneration standards), the following could be concluded: - development, implementation and supervision of the remuneration systems must be entrusted to independent remuneration committee or directly to the supervisory board; - banks must have remuneration policies in place, which would safeguard them from adverse selection and moral hazard, would prevent banks’ employees from taking business decisions that lead to weaker risk management system and at the same time would promote employees to pursue the vision, mission and goals approved by shareholders and management board; - fixed versus variable pay should depend on functions performed by the employee: employees performing control functions at the bank should get relatively large fixed salary compared to risk takers at the bank; - remuneration criteria should include risk aspects and be in line with a risk time horizon.