When young democracies comply - and when they don't: a case study of Lithuania's (non)compliance with judgments of the European court of human rights

ENThe ECHR system is often regarded as one of the world’s most effective human rights regimes, with unique mechanisms to ensure compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Despite this, there is a growing concern about judgment non-compliance, a trend that extends beyond non-democracies to include established and young democracies alike. This article investigates ‘democratic non-compliance’ through a process-tracing analysis of six cases against Lithuania, monitored by the Committee of Ministers (CoM) under the enhanced supervision track. As a young democracy with strong institutions but only a moderate compliance record, Lithuania presents a compelling puzzle. The article argues that certain democratic features themselves — such as electoral competition and legislative veto players — can obstruct the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments. While theoretically young democracies are expected to comply to signal their commitment to international norms, the analysis reveals a more pragmatic and nuanced approach, with material and tangible costs playing a central role for the legislature and reputational concerns for the executive. Meanwhile, the supervision of the CoM, while reliable, is not an independent driver of compliance but a catalyst whose effectiveness is contingent upon favourable domestic conditions. Keywords: European Court of Human Rights; Execution of Judgments; Committee of Ministers; Lithuania; Compliance.

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