Centrinių bankų veiklos skaidrumas

LTŠiame darbe nagrinėjamas centrinių bankų, kaip politiškai nepriklausomų institucijų, iškilimas ir dėl to atsiradusios "demokratinio deficito" problemos sprendimas veiklos viešumo ir skaidrumo būdu. "Demokratinio deficito" problemą lemia tai, kad kiekvieną pilietį, jo interesus paliečiančius sprendimus priima tiesiogiai neatskaitingi rinkėjams, taip pat ir nuo rinkiminiu būdu formuojamų institucijų politiškai nepriklausomi pareigūnai. Skaidrumas šį dešimtmetį vis dažniau ir dažniau tiek visuomenės, tiek akademinių sluoksnių, taip pat ir pačių centrinių bankų pradėtas akcentuoti kaip pagrindinė priemonė, galinti išspręsti "demokratinio deficito" problemą, garantuoti centrinių bankų patikimumą, nulemianti centrinių bankų priimtinumą. Remiantis atlikto tyrimo duomenimis, darbe lyginamas Vakarų bei Vidurio ir Rytų Europos šalių centrinių bankų skaidrumo lygis.

ENThis paper investigates the assumptions concerning the development of central bank political independence and the solution of the problem of their credibility and legitimacy, which appears when politically independent banks emerge, through the use transparency instruments. The mechanism of transparency, its role and instruments that ensure the functioning of the mechanism are examined and the specifics of transparency are revealed. Based on the data of the research carried out by the Centre of Central Banking Studies of England in 1999, the level of transparency in Western countries and in countries of Central and Eastern Europe is investigated, and the comparative analysis of these countries is made. The analysis also reveals that in some of the countries the level of transparency does not correspond to the criteria established in practice, and central banks with a higher degree of independence do not necessarily ensure a high level of transparency. The investigation of central bank transparency confirms the validity of the proposition that a need for transparency evolved from the demands for accountability in modern democracies. In Western countries, which have had longer traditions of democratic development, transparency has reached a much higher level than in the countries of Central or Eastern Europe. This may be said both about the general level and the indicators of separate sections of transparency. The forecast is made that a need for transparency will grow in Central and East European countries, as it did in the societies of Western countries. At the same time, the transparency level of central banks will rise as well.