Rusijos karinė doktrina: konvencinės ir branduolinės ginkluotės santykis

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Mokslo publikacijos / Scientific publications
Document Type:
Straipsnis / Article
Lietuvių kalba / Lithuanian
Rusijos karinė doktrina: konvencinės ir branduolinės ginkluotės santykis
In the Journal:
Politologija. 2002, Nr. 1 (25), p. 75-95
Lietuva (Lithuania); Rusija (Россия; Russia; Russia; Rossija; Rusijos Federacija; Rossijskaja Federacija).
Summary / Abstract:

LTStraipsnyje nagrinėjami šie klausimai: pagrindinės Rusijos karinės doktrinos nuostatos, implikuojančios konvencinės ir branduolinės ginkluotės raidos tendencijas; Rusijos konvencinių pajėgų būklė ir taktinio branduolinio ginklo naudojimo perspektyva kompensuojant konvencinių pajėgų sumažėjimą; Rusijos branduolinių pajėgų raidos tendencijos atsižvelgiant į Rusijos ekonominę situaciją ir Rusijos-JAV strateginius santykius. Tiriant Rusijos karinę doktriną, balansuojančią tarp konvencinės ir branduolinės ginkluotės naudojimo, daroma išvada, kad Rusija turėtų koncentruoti gynybą į strateginę puolamąją branduolinę ginkluotę. Analizuojami klausimai yra dr. Raimundo Lopatos ir dr. Česlovo Laurinavičiaus straipsnio „Karinė reforma Rusijoje: politinės trajektorijos" tęsinys. Autoriai dėkingi dr. R. Lopatai ir dr. Č. Laurinavičiui už suteiktą galimybę smulkiau analizuoti Rusijos konvencinės ir branduolinės ginkluotės pusiausvyros transformaciją, taip pat už naudingus pasiūlymus rengiant šį straipsnį. [Iš leidinio]Reikšminiai žodžiai: Konvencinis ginklas; Branduolinis ginklas; Karinė doktrina; Conventional arment; Nuclear arment; Military doctrine; Rusija (Russia).

ENThe research has been devoted to investigate a level of readiness and capabilities of conventional and nuclear forces of Russia. The aim was to examine Russian military doctrine balancing between the use of conventional and nuclear armaments and to draw up the possible doctrinal modification or prospects. The article was divided into several parts covering the main features of Russian military doctrine, its conventional armament issues, the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons and its implications on arms control sphere, the condition of strategic weapons and its capabilities. These indicators were being investigated in terms of arms control, technical capabilities and possible threats to Russia. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of main theatre weapon systems: main battle tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, artillery has been indicated declining Russia's capabilities to ensure its national security by conventional forces. Deplorable condition of conventional forces implies Russia's reliance on non-conventional weapons to ensure national security. Russia's willingness to rely more on nuclear forces (both tactical and strategic) was envisioned in the main documents of Russia's military doctrine. Russia has viewed its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal to be essential for compensating apparent weaknesses of conventional forces brought on by economic retraction; for upholding Russian status and prestige in the postcold war world; for countering the threat of chemical-biologic weapons; for preventing localized regional conflicts and deterring strategic escalation; and for fulfilling roles in battlefield nuclear combat.At risk is the informal regime on tactical nuclear weapons created by unilateral, parallel statements by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in September-October 1991 and slightly expanded by Boris Yeltsin's statement in January 1992. What is more, there were discussions in the United States and Russia about developing new classes of these weapons. Development of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal was analyzed in close relation with US foreign policy in general and strategic arsenal development policy in particular. US president made a decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty, which most experts viewed as a cornerstone of strategic stability. US withdrawal gave Russia a possibility to disregard START limitations to deploy MIRV'ed missiles, and Russia should not change its policy of deploying 1500 warheads during next 10-15 years. This policy would allow Russia to maintain sufficient forces for deterrence, develop and modernize its strategic arsenal in the most appropriate and optimal way and to save scarce resources for modernization of conventional forces. The November summit between President Bush and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin yielded a highly anticipated announcement on reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200. Current discussions on this issue have been demonstrated the US need to keep its strategic arsenal with paying no attention to Russian claims. Having analyzed Russian conventional and nuclear capabilities, we would draw up the conclusion that Russia should diminish its conventional army and the main focus must be done on the increase and modernization of its strategic weapons. [From the publication]

1392-1681; 2424-6034
2018-12-17 11:00:20
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