EU - Russia energy dialogue and Lithuania's energy security

ENNational security, energy security, and co-operation in the energy sector between Russia and the West start regaining their status of extra-popular subjects. After the unjustifiably long time Lithuania has eventually witnessed the opinion that its energy security is impaired by not only Russia’s, but also Western partners’ unfriendly policy. On the other hand, this “afflatus” has not produced the sufficient impetus to shaping Lithuania’s clear security policy and to starting its implementation. Action is limited to discontent that not all partners are friendly, that no account is taken of Lithuanian interests and that our problems are ignored. Frustration at the same time is accompanied with the hope that someone will help resolve those problems and offer an analogous NATO “umbrella” (by the way, such an initiative was brought up by the Polish Prime Minister). Unfortunately, from back in the times of the industrial revolution energy security has been a national matter, often much dearer (in all senses) than “friendship”. At present, there have been signs of developing the measures, which could neutralise Lithuania’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. However, many of them are beyond the means for a small state or even a group of states. What seems apparent is that Lithuania will not be able to stop the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline (recently renamed to “Nord Stream”) alongside our coast same as we would not have been able to lay the gas pipeline from Norway, which was planned ten years ago. At times decisions that can improve energy security are much simpler than that, requiring no billion-worth expenditure, which is never to pay off. This article demonstrates that not before the energy sector becomes a “normal” business submitting only to the laws of economy will it submit to other, geoenergetic, laws.The provided geoenergetics-based explanation of trade in energy resources describes the processes developing around Lithuania as natural and inevitable. Lithuania is stuck between Western Europe and Russia with all the resulting effects on our energy security, and none of the parties are interested in changing this situation. This is how it would have been remained be it not Russia’s decision to block gas supplies to Ukraine on the first days of January 2006. This Kremlin’s decision was not the first and, likewise, not the last (as also shown by the dry oil supplies to Mažeikių nafta). It is nevertheless special for destroying the established routine of trade in energy resources between Western Europe and Russia, which will have to be created anew. The statement that the development of a new order enables Lithuania to substantially improve its security status is based on the theory of the formation of international regimes. This change lies in presenting Europe with two alternatives: either the European Commission becomes a common focal point for energy policy, including security, or Lithuania makes its best effort to support the expansion of Russia-controlled enterprises to Western Europe to give the latter the chance to experience all the twists and turns of the Russian energy business. Both solutions would be beneficial for Lithuania with status quo being the most harmful option [p. 1-2].