The Lithuanian perspective
ENThe Lublin Triangle initiative, which is one of many emerging regional cooperation formats (reflecting the ever-progressing process of the regionalization of international relations), has both symbolic and practical significance. Individual accents, however, are distributed differently in the case of the three states that make up the Triangle – and, additionally, completely different from the perspective of Belarus. The essential symbolic value of this format stems from the shared historical and cultural heritage. In practical terms, an important factor determining the creation of the Triangle is the common awareness of the threat from Russia (this threat is also part of the historical heritage of the region) as well as common interests. The purpose of creating regional institutions is not only to facilitate cooperation and increase trust between partners in the region but also to build the international position of both the region and the states that make it up – this is also the case with the Lublin Triangle. The international situation (Russian aggression) has increased interest in the region of Central Europe and objectively increased its importance in international relations. The emerging regional cooperation initiatives are supposed to, by complementing each other and creating a synergy effect, strengthen this subjectivity of the region; it is not only about the Triangle but also about B9 or the Three Seas Initiative, also in the institutional dimension. The correctness of such a strategy is confirmed to some extent by the decidedly negative stance of Russia, which since the beginning of the existence of the Lublin Triangle has been trying to simultaneously depreciate it as an irrelevant and marginal formula and present it as a dangerous, neo-imperial project through which Poland intends to re build its influence in the region.Paradoxically, it is Russia, with its aggressive policy, that has significantly contributed to the fact that Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, despite having many prejudices against each other and a long history of conflicts and mutual grievances, constantly look to strengthen cooperation and refer to common tradition and history, and not to dislike each other. The countries of the Triangle, counting on the cooperation and benefits derived from it (also of a political and international nature), emphasize a common heritage and closeness, but they are guided by diverse motives and expectations. While strengthening its position in the region through active participation in regional initiatives, Poland strives to use this as an instrument to strengthen its position on the international scene, also within the EU and NATO. For Ukraine, the Triangle is an important element of the “small alliances strategy”, which consists in creating a network of alliances to stabilize Ukraine’s security environment. Security issues are now crucial for Ukraine, so participation in the Triangle is important from the point of view of military support in the fight against Russian aggression, but also in the context of post-war assistance – reconstruction, infrastructure projects, etc. – and as a vehicle for integration with “large alliances”. From Lithuania’s perspective, the Triangle is a useful platform for regulating relations with its neighbours and an important element of the regional security architecture. With regard to Belarus, there is a consensus that it should become part of the Quadrangle in the future, although at present, this is a purely hypothetical scenario taking into account the level of dependence Alexander Lukashenko has on Russia, his hostile attitude towards his western neighbours, and the ongoing de facto process of the “creeping annexation” of Belarus by Russia.However, support for the Belarusian opposition is postulated, and it is emphasized that Belarus is also part of the common historical and cultural heritage of the Triangle. Importantly, the heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is an important element of the national identity for a significant number of Belarusians (up to 40%), so it should be borne in mind that this may be a source of tensions between Belarusians and Lithuanians in the future. The Ukrainian’s consistent ignoring of the Belarusian opposition (with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya at the forefront) is also problematic. The common heritage of the states and nations that form the foundation of the Triangle can help to bind them, but it can also be manipulated by taking advantage of numerous historical conflicts and contradictions. Opponents of Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian cooperation will take advantag of this – both radical political forces within these states and the Russian disinformation and propaganda machine will try to fuel mutual prejudices and play on emotions, referring to, for example, the idea that the Triangle is an instrument of Polish neo-imperial ambitions. Other external actors may also have a different attitude towards the Triangle: for example, from the point of view of some Western Europe an states, this initiative may be unfavourable (because it increases the importance and political potential of Central Europe), while the United States will support it, as this for mat is in line with the American strategy for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank.
