The Question of the limits of cognition in Kant's philosophy
ENThe article examines the question of the limits of cognition arising in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, expressed by the concepts of “thing in itself”, “noumenon”, “transcendental object”, and others. The conception of cognitive limits is analyzed within the context of Kant’s reconstructed theory of experience. The links between the idea of the “thing in itself”, and the Kantian concept of empirical knowledge as a synthesis between the material of sensory experience and the conceptual form are discussed. The concept of “metaphysical nominalism” is introduced in the interpretation of Kant’s theory of knowledge, and certain social aspects are brought into the theory of transcendental consciousness, which is important in Kant’s conception of experience. Epistemological and ontological aspects of Kant’s comprehension of the limits of cognition are distinguished by analyzing Kant’s understanding of natural science and metaphysical cognition. Keywords: apriorism, thing in itself, metaphysical nominalism, experience, cognition, transcendental consciousness.
