International aspects of the Russian troops' withdrawal from the Baltics: the issue of the Russian minority as a European question and internal matter, 1992-1994

ENThe tiny Latvian village of Marciena enjoys nowadays a certain popularity among nostalgic travellers seeking traces of the Soviet past. Indeed, it hosts a former residential district called Gorodok (Tittle town in Russian), built for Soviet officers that should work at a new missile base. The base was unfinished, and the Russians had to leave the country after the independence. Gorodok turned into a slum. Today, many ruins of the former Soviet military presence remain in the Baltic region. They show a rather hasty withdrawal that began in 1992 and ended in 1994 (apart from two nuclear facilities that were dismantled in 1998). Since their independence in September 1991, the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania tried to regain their entire sovereignty. They shared a common destiny and a mutual goal: to get free from the Russian sphere of influence. In turn, Moscow was confronted by a new dilemma. On one hand, it had to maintain good relations with neighbours already eager to join European structures. On the other hand, Russia had to withdraw its armed forces from its former empire. Indeed, there was a widespread perception of decline among Russian public opinion that led to the rise of conservative forces in the country. The ‘Baltic case’ became an important issue in the political debate, as far as Russian military forces stationed there had to be removed. The condition of their departure became from 1992 to 1994 an internal and international matter.This case study focuses on the issue posed by the removal of Russian troops from the Baltic states. Why did Moscow establish a link between the complete withdrawal of Russian military forces from the former soviet republics, and the respect of the ‘Russian minority rights’ there? This paper focuses on the complex articulation between internal and external factors that could explain the evolutions of a Russian position on this issue. It then analyses Moscow’s new strategy towards pan-European institutions such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in order to defend its interests and to justify its policy. [Extract, p. 247]