La Prémisse mobiliste de la perception sensible dans le Théétète de Platon: cartographie des mouvements

ENIn the first part of Plato’s Theaetetus Socrates provides an image of the motions that give rise to individual sensation. This picture plays, in the dialogue, an essential role in establishing the first definition of knowledge (epistēmē), as well as in refuting it. The main question of my analysis concerns the direction of the motions of sensation (aisthēsis) and feeling (aisthēton) at the decisive moment of the generation of a particular sensation. In the first place, I study the uses of the preposition πρός, constructed with the genitive in 156d-e and 159d-e. The correct interpretation of this element of the description contributes to making the picture drawn by Socrates and his subsequent criticism of it more intelligible.In the first part of Plato’s Theaetetus Socrates provides an image of the motions that give rise to individual sensation. This picture plays, in the dialogue, an essential role in establishing the first definition of knowledge (epistēmē), as well as in refuting it. The main question of my analysis concerns the direction of the motions of sensation (aisthēsis) and feeling (aisthēton) at the decisive moment of the generation of a particular sensation. In the first place, I study the uses of the preposition πρός, constructed with the genitive in 156d-e and 159d-e. The correct interpretation of this element of the description contributes to making the picture drawn by Socrates and his subsequent criticism of it more intelligible.