ENUntil 2006 both laws of the criminal and administrative processes had a rather „peaceful” life - respective practices of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, as well as the doctrine, were developing coherently, without any significant revolutions. However we can affirm that in 2006 four decisions of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania (dated January 16, March 28, May 9 and September 21) stormed into this peaceful life like a tornado. After the adoption of the above mentioned decisions in all process laws a number of essential novelties occurred, which need to be evaluated. If concealed, it would be possible to state that those branches of the science of the jurisprudence simply do not exist in Lithuania. And finally, it is the first time when the doctrine of the process branches of jurisprudence was directly influenced by experts of other branches of jurisprudence. So, what are the novelties? Firstly, the occurred concept of the judicial precedent, common in the Anglo-Saxon, but not in the Continental law system, must be recognised as revolutionary. So is the formulated doctrine of the precedent factually a classical precedent? And if yes, can we say that we are turning away from the tradition, which lasts for ages in Lithuania, of the Continental law towards the common Law system? The second „novelty” is the talking of the Constitutional Court about the jurisdiction systems in general, at the same time stepping towards the formation of a solid „process law” concept (Justizrecht). Thirdly, the idea formulated by this Court, that the Constitutional principle of the legal state requires that jurisdictional and other institutions of the law practice aim to establish the objective truth. Does this attitude practically mean that we have to essentially revise and change in all branches of the process law the role of the court practically going back to the „soviet” process model?.Fourthly, the attitude of the Constitutional Court that the constitutional right of a person to apply to court guaranties that the final act of the first instance court may be appealed against in at least one superior instance court. Hence, the appeal becomes an inseparable part of the right to the judicial defence. Is such approach grounded? How does it correlate with the Convention of the European Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? And what influence it might have on functioning of the judicial system? Fifthly, the approach of the Constitutional Court that there cannot be any legal regulation, when the court first of all announces the introductory and the resolutionary parts of the decision and afterwards states the descriptive and reasoning parts. And, finally, sixthly, the issue of the powers of the court speaking about the right of the court to exceed the limits set in the appeal when it is required by the public interest. It has been tried to discuss all the above mentioned issues in the paper.